LANGUAGE, as a function of man, is a frequent subject of inquiry in the course of Aristotle's scientific investigations; for language not only has a natural basis in man's bodily organs and psychological powers, but it is, in turn, one of the natural bases of the virtues and of social and political relations, and it constitutes the natural means of imitation in the art of literature and the matter of which literary works are formed. In addition to such inquiries into the foundations of language in human organism, moral agent, and aesthetic object, Aristotle turns his attention to questions concerning the operations of language, for it can be put to various uses, and it can in any of them contravene as well as accomplish the purpose to which it is directed. Finally, on the background of these considerations of language as natural phenomenon and as rational instrument, Aristotle analyzes the arts of language in terms of symbolic properties and linguistic structures. Logic, rhetoric, and poetic are none of them purely "verbal arts" in Aristotle's philosophy: they are based on the natural properties of words, which are determined by physiological organs and physical medium, as well as on the conventional meanings which are determined by human reason and desire; they take into account the purposes for which men use language as reflected in the intentions of the speaker, the susceptibilities of the audience addressed, and the nature of the communications for which it serves as medium; and they treat, finally, of discourse in its various forms and relative to its proper parts. Language, as natural phenomenon, is part of the subject matter of the sciences-theoretic, practical, and productive. Language, as conventional medium adequate to, or at variance with, the purposes for which man uses it, is both an instrument and a problem in the formation of these sciences and in the development and acquisition of knowledge, virtues, and arts. Language, as artificial composition and symbolic structure, is the end of the numerous arts which are employed in scientific demonstrations, practical communications and regulations, and aesthetic compositions.
the purposes for which men use language as reflected in the intentions of the speaker, the susceptibilities of the audience addressed, and the nature of the communications for which it serves as medium; and they treat, finally, of discourse in its various forms and relative to its proper parts. Language, as natural phenomenon, is part of the subject matter of the sciences-theoretic, practical, and productive. Language, as conventional medium adequate to, or at variance with, the purposes for which man uses it, is both an instrument and a problem in the formation of these sciences and in the development and acquisition of knowledge, virtues, and arts. Language, as artificial composition and symbolic structure, is the end of the numerous arts which are employed in scientific demonstrations, practical communications and regulations, and aesthetic compositions.
Since language is part of the subject matter in practical and productive as well as theoretic scientific investigations, the discussion of language and even the meanings of the basic terms of that discussion extend far beyond purely material or verbal problems. The physical sounds which man uses to convey meanings and the physiological organs by which the sounds are produced are objects of physi-195 expression are formed and in the sense that the form in each variety of composition is found in the analysis of its proper Xoyos or argument.
Language has many uses to which it has been put by man and many purposes which it may serve, and although these uses have as natural basis the properties and effects of language, its meanings are determined by habit and convention. The criteria which are pertinent to the judgment of statements intended to serve the various purposes of linguistic use are themselves various, and although any given statement may happen, in its various contexts, to achieve several purposes, it is possible to separate those purposes and indicate the considerations pertinent to judging their achievement. In the theoretic use of language the criteria are to be found in adequacy to the expression of a subject matter; in the practical use of language the criteria are to be found in the effect of language or reason in the moral control of desires and convictions, while the related criteria of rhetoric are in appropriateness to the effect intended to be produced in an audience of a particular character; in the poetic use of language the criteria are to be found in the qualities achieved in the work of art. A scientific composition may be considered in terms of its effect on an audience or in terms of its intrinsic beauty; or a poem may be treated in terms of its truth, its popularity, and its social effectiveness; but even such shifts of consideration depend on the possibility of differentiating those properties of a statement which make it theoretically significant, practically effective, and poetically beautiful.
The use of symbols as instruments of scientific inquiry and proof depends both on the nature of things, which the symbols must express translucently without distortion due to the peculiarities of the symbols or the passions or convictions of minds, and also on the properties of symbols by which such expression is possible. The end of scientific inquiry is to make the statement of principles and conclusions approximate accurately the nature and divisions of things: when this is done, according to Aristotle, "argument" (X6ayos) and "form" (ebos) become equivalent expressions.3 The achievement of truth, then, depends not only on knowledge of the form in things but also on awareness of the properties of language which make it possible to reproduce the form in argument: the characteristics of individual words and terms, their combinations in assertion and proposition, and the rules for their use as end and middle terms in argument and inference. This identity of form and statement can be achieved, not by measuring particular propositions against actual circumstances which they are meant to designate, but by discovering essential connections and causal laws and by relating particular propositions to the universal propositions which state such laws. The danger of error and fallacy in the search for scientific proofs arises from the obvious fact that the principles of an argument are not always statements adequately based on the nature of things; sometimes they are the expression of widely received opinion and sometimes distortions of received opinion, and sometimes, when the principles are true expressions of opinion, the conclusions only seem to follow from them as verbally plausible consequences. The use of language as a logical instrument can be differentiated into demonstrative, dialectical, and sophistical modes, each with its appropriate problems and canons. The analytic of demonstration or the use of language in the processes of scientific in-any one subject matter; but "rhetoric" is unlike "dialectic" in that it may refer not only to the knowledge of an art but also, like "sophistic," to the moral purpose with which the art is used. When principles are established by consulting opinions and probabilities rather than by direct inquiry into the nature of things, the proof is dialectical rather than demonstrative or scientific, and any argument may be applied dialectically to a variety of subject matters. When the consideration of justice and the good is based on commonplaces determined by the opinions of men, rather than on a consideration of moral habits or social institutions, the influence of discourse is rhetorical rather than moral or political, for arguments may be found by the use of rhetoric for and against any action or any end. The application of discourse to its subject matter is achieved differently in the theoretic and the practical sciences; and it is possible to shift from principles warranted by subject matter in either theory or practice to principles warranted by appeal to opinion-to a statement of probability dialectically grounded in the consensus of men or of scientists or to a statement of expediency, justice, or honor rhetorically grounded in the circumstances and the convictions and emotions of particular audiences and groups of men. In both dialectic and rhetoric, moreover, a further shift of argument is possible from the authority of widespread and well-grounded opinion to the distortion of opinion or the manipulation of consequences derived from opinion: this shift in the moral attitude toward the opinions and words used constitutes the difference between dialectic and sophistic and distinguishes one of the possible modes of rhetoric.
The use of symbols as matter and means of artistic production, finally, de-pends on the properties of symbols as such, their use symbolically for the presentation of thought and the representation of action, and the organization of symbols in the "argument" (X6-yos) of a literary work. Language is the means of imitation in literature; it is the matter from which a poem is constructed; and the form of the poem, however much it may depend on the subject treated, is achieved by devices which may be recognized in the manner and organization of the expression. The characteristics of words as sounds, rhythms, and styles are the particular concern of this use of language; and, whereas they are also pertinent to achieving rhetorical ends, the prose of rhetoric is differentiated from poetic discourse by its closer approximation to ordinary speech. The characteristics of words as symbols, however, are no less important; and the poetic use of language is similar to the practical, since the element of thought in tragedy-to take the example on which Aristotle has stated his position most fully-may be defined as saying whatever can be said or what is appropriate to the occasion, and not only do the speeches in tragedy fall under the arts of politics and rhetoric, but language is the means of relating the thoughts of a character to his actions. Finally the action in a play, like the subject matter in a science, is presented by the argument (Xoyos) or plot (MAios). The problems and faults, like the devices, of poetic composition are distinct from the similar difficulties encountered in the theoretic or practical uses of language. Impossibilities and improbabilities are faults in the poetic treatment of actions; but they may be justified if they serve the ends of poetry by making the action more astounding; and, in general, a convincing improbability is preferable, for the purposes of poetry, to an unconvincing possibility.
Moreover, if the poet's description is not true in fact, it may be convincing as a representation of what the object ought to be; and if it is neither true nor a presentation of what ought to be, it may be defended if it is in accordance with opinion.
Again, if what is said and done is not morally right, it may be defended as appropriate to persons and circumstances. Finally, other problems of aesthetic and literary criticism are found in the need of recognizing the strange words the poet may use, of understanding his metaphors, and, in general, of interpreting the language of his text, as well as in those problems of clarity, accuracy, and appropriateness for which analogues may be found in logic and rhetoric.
Once the nature of language and the variety of its uses have been recognized, it is possible to treat language in terms of the art of constructing "arguments." For any analysis of discourse, whatever the theory on which it proceeds, must ultimately treat the constitution of a body of words in terms of its structure and appropriate parts. Since Aristotle differentiates a great variety of "arguments," he seeks different structures and parts in the analysis of arguments, depending on the purpose for which the argument has been constructed. Demonstrative, dialectical, and sophistic "arguments" all have the ostensible purpose of formulating true or probable statements, and the criteria of their construction are in some reference to the facts. The parts of such arguments are univocal "terms" combined as nouns and verbs in "propositions," which are true or false, and "syllogisms," in which inference is made from the truth, necessity, or probability of certain propositions to that of others. In rhetorical "arguments" or speeches, it is possible to separate the consideration of arguments from that of style, that is, questions of what ought to be said 198 RICHARD MCKEON from questions of how it ought to be said; but the criteria of both must be sought in reference to the audience, and only secondarily to the subject of discourse as determined by the audience. The parts of rhetorical arguments, like the parts of logical propositions, are nouns and verbs; but, since the connections in rhetorical argumentation are frequently verbal rather than inferential, conjunctions assume great importance; and, since metaphorical terms may be added to literal terms for purposes of persuasion, the construction of metaphors is of particular interest to prose writers. In the combination of statements into enthymemes and examples, proofs and apparent-proofs, and, finally, into speeches, the great stylistic virtues are clarity and appropriateness. Poetic "arguments" or plots are statements of action in narrative or dramatic form and are dependent, therefore, on the verbal expression of thought as representation of character. The criteria for the construction of the plot are to be found neither in the adequacy of the representation to what happens to be the case nor in the moral or practical responses of audiences, but in the structure which is achieved in the interplay of action, character, and thought pertinent to the poetic end. The parts of such "arguments," since they depend not only on connections demonstrated between facts or expressed between statements but also on connections perceived between the sounds and inflections of words, include the letter and the syllable as well as words-the conjunction, the article, the noun, and the verb-the cases of words and the speech (Xoyos) itself; they go beyond the metaphorical expressions of rhetoric to the more unusual words proper to poetry, but not to prose, combined in more inclusive metaphorical statements, and the poem itself may be viewed as a speech resulting from conjunction of speeches.
Aristotle treated language, as subject matter, in the several sciences adapted to the investigation of the physical medium and organic production of sounds, the psychological bases of meanings, the practical use of discourse and communication, and the artistic production of literature. The variety of dimensions suggested in the scientific analysis of language as a physical, biological, psychological, moral, political, and poetic phenomenon indicates the variety of purposes to which language is put and the variety of sources from which criteria of its use may be sought for different purposes: from the subject matter of the discourse; the intentions, ideas, feelings, or purposes of the speaker; the susceptibilities or expectations of the hearer; the standards of excellence set by prudence for action or discovered in the object of art. The nature and uses of language determine the three arts of language-logic, rhetoric, and poetic-which Aristotle, following the implications of his philosophy, organized as separate arts. In each he initiated manners of analysis which were long influential in the development of the art and meanings which were long attached to many of its fundamental technical terms. Aristotle did not, however, set up a philosophy of language or a science of symbols or signs. Significances are not natural, although both signs and what is signified may be; and there is no natural symbolic entity apart from the natural phenomena of language and its theoretic, practical, and productive uses. In the philosophy of Aristotle, sciences and arts are differentiated by their subject matters and purposes, and the several uses of language lead to the differentiation of logic, rhetoric, and poetic as the proper arts of language. The historical treatment of Aristotle's contributions to the linguistic and symbolic aspects of these arts has usually been conditioned by the supposition on the part of scholars and historians that there is a proper approach to language or a unified science of languagephilology, grammar, psychology, logic, or semantics-and even in that history of reactions to Aristotle that goes by the name of "Aristotelianism" or "Aristotelian scholarship," Aristotle's treatment of language has been criticized both for separating language impossibly from its functions and for making it depend inseparably on commitments concerning things other than pure language. His logic has been censured as formal or verbal or even as restricted to the peculiarities of the Greek language and, not less frequently or more plausibly, as departing from linguistic or symbolic analyses in the interests of an irrelevant and stultifying anthropology, psychology, or metaphysics.
The criticisms of Aristotle's analyses of language depend on bringing together what Aristotle says in various contexts and sciences without consideration of the functional differentiations in the analyses. The treatments of many particular subjects, so assembled, seem confused and contradictory, and they have therefore been presented as evidence of stages of evolution to a more recent scientific truth or away from an earlier Platonic truth. Thus grammarians, when they examine the history of their subject, usually assign Aristotle an important place in the development of the "parts of speech"; but they are puzzled both because his enumeration of four parts (conjunction, article, noun, and verb) makes it difficult to explain how he could have observed so many parts of speech and no more and also because he expounded his views most extensively in the Poetics, as if he did not realize that the parts of speech belong to grammar or philology.4 Yet a comparison of his enumerations of parts of speech-four in the Poetics, three (noun and verb, to which conjunction is added) in the Rhetoric, and two (noun and verb) in On Interpretation, to which a third, the definite article, is added, but without great logical significance, in the Prior Analytics -suggests that the numbers depend on differences in the "parts" found in speech as it serves the ends of poetical construction, rhetorical persuasion, and logical demonstration and that none of these senses would be strictly pertinent to the analyses of formal grammar.
The problems of language have, however, been generalized in the history of philosophy to assume philosophic as well as philological universality. This may happen in either of two ways: the characteristics of language may be assimilated to some variety of things or processes, or the nature of things may be found to be basically linguistic or discursive. Discourse and symbols may be made into subjects to be treated in an independent science or in an architectonic science which takes the place of metaphysics in a system of speculation; or the investigation of metaphysical, psychological, and moral problems may disclose in the proper subject matters of those problems peculiarities of discourse dissociated from their original verbal connotations. These two tendencies have been prominent in the major philosophic controversies of the ages, and they have therefore, not un- It is tempting to suppose that highly elaborated doctrines of writers like Aristotle are treated adequately as stages toward distinctions and sciences which they did not express or describe and that their theories are lisping anticipations of later contradictory theories of the same matter. It is a supposition which has wide currency in the philosophic treatment of what other men say, and it has the authority of Aristotle's own practice in treating the scientific doctrines and philosophic theories of his predecessors. Unfortunately, it entails the disadvantages of distortion: the details of the doctrine must be ignored except as they fit another conception of science and other basic principles; and discrepancies between the doctrine analyzed and the criteria imposed must be interpreted as evidence of inconsistencies among the stages in the development of the author's position and as marks of the gradual crystallization of what later became technical terms and concepts. But if the philosophic use of history distorts earlier philosophies to purposes for which they were not conceived, the historical examination of philosophies may serve to reconstruct a past philosophy in its own terms, not as a stage to other philosophies, but as a rival to them and a source of theories which might be set in opposition to theories later current. Aristotle's analyses of language are worthy of such treatment precisely because his particular statements have in many cases been influential, but his theory has not been followed. He treated the phenomena of language in great detail, yet he did not construct a single science of language-a universal grammar, a symbolic logic, a semantics, or a physiological psychology. He did not construct a symbolic analysis based on formal rules of construction and operation without concern with actual content or historical usages, nor did he build a linguistic structure intended to duplicate the contextures of thought, concatenations of nervous system, or organizations of things. His theories are carefully drawn in opposition to these theories, which had currency later, and many of the confusions attributed to him result from reading his doctrines from the point of view of such theories, which are often modern forms of ancient positions which he thought to be erroneous. Aristotle's examination of the scientific basis of language serves both to prevent philosophic or semantic reductions of language to things, thoughts, or operations and also to discriminate among the arts those in which language is an instrument of knowledge and control relative to natural processes and things, those in which it is a medium of communication and understanding relative to men, and those in which it is a form of edification and pleasure relative to human products.
I. THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE: THE HUMAN ORGANISM AND ITS FUNCTIONS
The natural basis of "language" (X0'yos) is "voice" or "articulate sound" (4wvi); and voice, in turn, is to be distinguished both from its articulation in "speech" (ta4XEKTOS) and from its natural basis in "sound" (0'6oos). The distinction is, in part, one of sounds and, in part, one of meanings. Voice is the matter of language, and man is peculiarly endowed among animals, since he alone makes use of voice in language.5 Sounds are produced by anything which is capable of setting in motion a single mass of air which is continuous from the impinging body to the organ of hearing, and sounds are therefore studied in the psychological investigation of the sense of hearing,' but voice is a special kind of sound made by an animal, for it is a sound with meaning and is dependent, therefore, on the possession of special organs and on their operation, which is a function of the soul.7 Teeth, lips, and tongue have, among other purposes, a function in the production of articulate sounds.8 Language consists, on the material side, of the combination of sounds called "letters" (7pa,iiiiara) produced in voice by lips, teeth, tongue, and other organs; and, although other animals than man can utter indivisible sounds and have voices, man, and after man some birds, are peculiarly equipped to utter letters. The study of the mechanisms for the production of voice is part of biology; but the differences of letters, such as the distinctions between vowel, semi-vowel, and mute, as well as the nature and extent of these differences in syllabic combina- In the scientific use of language, when propositions and arguments are properly constructed, they are symbolic of ideas in the mind; and those ideas flow in a discourse comparable to the verbal discourse in which they are expressed. When the purpose of discourse is to record and communicate knowledge, words express thoughts which image things, and knowledge is set forth in proofs whose principles are tested in things. Both thought and words are constituted into kinds of discourse. Yet it is possible to treat the two separately; and Aristotle occasionally notes, when lie is using language as an example or refuting fallacious arguments, that the discourse which is said to be a discrete quantity is the discourse (X6yos) expressed in sound, or that those who argue for the sake of argument can be convinced only by refuting the argument (X6yos) as expressed in voice and words.'5 On the other hand, he argues, when it is a 203 question of scientific proof, that demonstration is addressed not to the verbal discourse but to the discourse (X'Tyos) within the soul. No syllogism is addressed to the outer discourse, since we can always raise verbal objections to anything expressed in words, but we cannot always object to the inner discourse."6 That inner discourse consists of mental experiences or, as Aristotle likes to put it, of what the soul undergoes, the passions of the soul. The discourse expressed in sound and voice is symbolic of these passions, much as written discourse is symbolic of spoken. There is, however, an important difference between the two discourses. The passions of the soul, which are symbolized in verbal discourse, are natural occurrences, for the reaction of the organism to stimuli in sensation and emotion follow natural laws and they are therefore the same for all men, as are the things of which our experiences are the images; verbal discourse, on the other hand, is significant only by convention, for no noun or verb has its meaning by nature.17 The discourse of the soul not only is the source of the meanings attached to the articulations of verbal sounds but also gives verbal discourse, by supplying it with meanings, a kind of natural status in the things concerning which it may be true and in the minds on which it may be effective or informative. The discourse of the soul and verbal discourse are in a sense the same discourse, since words are symbolic directly only of thoughts, and therefore discourse-XMyOS -may signify speech or thought, and there is no sharp line to separate the formula expressive of meaning from the meaning expressed in formula.
Language and thought are closely related, and linguistic meaning is not distinct from psvchological meaning-In- 16 Posterior Analytics i. 10. 76b24-27. 17 Interpret. 1. 16a346 and 2. 16a27-29.
deed, in some modern theories the closeness of the relation is taken to be an identity in the sense that there is no thought beyond verbal discourse and no meaning as such apart from the symbol and the thing signified. Aristotle, on the other hand, separated thought from perception because of consequences in thought of the operation of discourse. The perception of the proper objects of sense is always free from error, since an animal truly perceives what it perceives, and whether or not the object is as it is perceived is a further question dependent on judgment as well as on perception. Thought, on the other hand, may be true or false, for thought is found only where there is discourse of reason (Xo-yo).'8 Imagination is shown to be distinct, in like fashion, from perception, discursive thought, and opinion, because, for one thing, opinion, unlike imagination, is accompanied by belief, belief by conviction, and conviction by discourse of reason, and there are animals which possess both sense and imagination without discourse of reason."9 On the other hand, Aristotle queried the scientific basis of the division of the soul into parts or faculties, even by means of differences that take into account the rational or discursive powers of man; and he criticized Plato's division of the soul into the calculative (Xcyw-ruOv), the passionate, and the desiderative, as well as the popular division into the rational (or that which possesses discourse, ro Xo6yov Exov) and the irrational (aXo'yov), since the possible and defensible bases of differentiation are infinite.20 On functional grounds, however, powers and potentialities in general may be divided into two kinds, the rational (Cuera Xo6yov) and the irrational (&Xoyov In the practical use of language, when actions are directed to an end or when standards are examined or promulgated, the rules of action are instances of "discourse" which might be translated into action or elaborated by verbal exposition or given force as social enactment. When the end of analysis and discourse is action, the standard for action is determined in thought and communicated in discourse. As the passions and thoughts of the mind are constituted a kind of discourse when examined in scientific inquiry, so discourse is made a kind of rational principle and rule when employed in practical action. It is important for the analysis of human actions in ethics, therefore, to recognize that man alone possesses discourse, reason, and science; and, consequently, the distinction, which Aristotle describes as one made in popular discussions, between the rational and the irrational parts of the soul, seems to him adequate to serve as foundation to the analysis of the virtues, however unsatisfactory it may be as a psychological theory. It supplies a functional interrelation of habits, inasmuch as the irrational part may be further subdivided into a vegetative part, which is not subject to habituation and in no way shares in the rational principle, and an Discourse is therefore essentially connected with the practical as well as the theoretic sciences: as it is an indispensable instrument in the acquisition of knowledge, so, too, as verbal means of communication, it is essential to the community of shared values and institutions, and, as rational principle, it is the standard of virtue and action.
In the artistic use of language, when words are used as matter for poetic composition, the forms of poetry may be viewed in terms of the plots which are the soul of poetry or of the arguments (X6'yoL) in which the plots are developed. When the end of composition is the production of a poem, language both constitutes the parts and determines the whole; and thought is expressed, character is conveyed, and ultimately action is set forth or narrated by means of words. Voice (/xi'v) and language (Xo6yos) are among the means of imitation used in the various arts, language with the pleasurable accessories of rhythm and harmony being proper to the art of tragedy.39 The natural basis of poetry is therefore imitation, while the literary means of imitation, or the matter from which the poem is constructed, is expression in language (E' Xo6'yw). The origin of poetry is due to two causes found in human nature. Imitation is natural to man from childhood, and one of his advantages over the lower animals is that he is the most imitative of all creatures and learns at first by imitation. It is also nat-ural for man to delight in works of imitation. To be learning something is one of the greatest of pleasures not only to the philosopher but also to the rest of mankind, and the reason for the delight one takes in an imitation is that one is at the same time learning. Moreover, the sense of harmony and rhythm, like imitation, is natural to man.40 The original differentiations into kinds of poetry, however, were determined by differences in the poets and their preferences among kinds of actions to be represented. 41 The origins of the poetic use of language are thus not unrelated to the inquiry and learning which motivate its scientific use; the differentiation into kinds is determined by considerations, not of genera of subject matter but of individual character; and character, in turn, is determined by discourse and thought in their practical use. Poetry is therefore distinguished from theory and practice by the pleasure proper to the poem itself, in which the unity is constituted by argument and plot (XO'0S KaL ,u vos) expressed in language (X'yos) and in which the diction, in turn, may be viewed as a whole and analyzed into eight parts (among which assiduous grammarians have found four "parts of speech"), ranging from the letter which is the element of diction, through the syllable, the conjunction, the article, the noun, the verb, and the case to the speech itself, which is composite significant sound, so defined that the definition of a word or a simple assertion and the Iliad as a whole 
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II. THE OPERATIONS OF LANGUAGE: HUMAN THOUGHT AND ITS EXPRESSION
LANGUAGE is treated among the subject matters of the theoretic, practical, and productive sciences. It is related to its bases in the organism and the soul of man; its practical efficacy as rule of prudence and as instrument of communication is examined in determining the proportion which is sought in virtuous action and the bond of justice by which states are held together; its artistic realizations are discovered in the constructions of poetry. Yet in each of these sciences in which it is a subject matter language is also an instrument of inquiry and statement, and, in addition, it serves other functions beyond these scientific uses. The analysis of things is presented in language; and, when language is used scientifically, criteria by which to test statement and argument are sought in the subject matters which the sciences treat. Even the language of science, moreover, may be viewed not only in terms of its adaptation to the processes of inquiry and proof relative to the subject matter of the sciences but also in terms of its development in acquisition and use relative to processes in the mind of the inquirer and in terms of its elements and combinations relative to the symbolic system employed in stating and formulating the results of inquiry. The uses of language, however, do not all follow the model of scientific inquiry and proof, nor are they limited to the devices by which science is acquired and set forth. In its scientific uses, language, as well as the thought it expresses, is made to conform as closely as possible to a subject matter. Language may also express a normative rule for action which, if successfully performed, may alter the actual situation; and the criteria for such rules of action must be sought in potentialities that may or may not be actualized or in communities that may or may not be established or that may be preserved or destroyed. Language may, again, be determined by the relation between speaker and audience, and the criteria for expression no less than the conception of subject matter must then be sought in thoughts and emotions already possessed or to be conveyed. Language may, finally, find its efficacy primarily in the instrumentalities of words and style, even to the extent of making the improbable seem plausible and the unconventional acceptable; and the criteria for thought and the conception of nature must then be sought in the development of the argument and in the elements and combinations by which it is expressed. The development of an argument may thus be determined by science or by prudence or by art-or by dialectical, sophistical, or rhetorical supplements or approximations to such developments -and thoughts and occurrences may be set forth in expressions determined by consideration, real or apparent, of truth and probability or of justice and expediency or of form and pleasure. Arguments language as make possible fallacy and error, vice and sophistry, artistic license and fault. Since language is the peculiar function of an animal who possesses a soul, that is, the imagination requisite for the imposition of meanings, as well as the special organs requisite for the production of voice, the marks of meaning may be found in the analysis of language as a symbolic structure or in the analysis of thought as expressed in language or in the analysis of things as signified by thought. The discourse of the mind, which is expressed in verbal discourse, may serve to organize thought, action, or production; but to do so it must discover a rational order in things or impose such an order. The characteristics of discourse are thus traced back to mental powers and physical processes, and, indeed, the significance of the word Xo6yos is extended from statements in language to include in its meaning thoughts in minds and forms in things. But if language may be identical with reason, it may also be used contrary to reason; statements may correspond with what is essential in things, and they may also be false and contrary to fact; and, although art may be based on what has happened and although it has moral and political effects, the'presentation of the improbable and the morally wrong may be artistically preferable to the tiue and the better. However language is used-to express the results of impartial inquiry, to communicate purposes or persuade to action, or to arouse the pleasure proper to discourses artistically contrived-the symbolic function is to be found in the relation of language to what is expressed, but the determination of that relation may turn on considerations of subject matter or of emotions and purposes or of form.
There is no simple equivalence between discourse and things. At each stage of the combination of words into statements and arguments or of the decomposition of arguments into their parts, language may be dissociated from any strict reference to things. Words may be ambiguous; assertions may be amphibolous; discussions and inquiry may be pursued for no other purpose than for the sake of the argument. The problem is, in part, a problem of the meanings of terms; in part, a problem of the combination of terms in assertions; in part, a problem of the grounds for the assertion of the principle or conclusion of an argument. A term may have a single meaning or several; a statement may be about a single thing or several; an argument may proceed from the reason, the fact, or simply from what was said. But even when a "single" word or a "single" statement is about "one" and the "same" thing, the words "one" and the "same,") as used either in discourse or in the analysis of discourse, may have many meanings, and there are as many senses of "being" as there are of "one" and the "same." These differentiations of statement and being are essential preliminaries to discovering the respect in which the being or nature of a thing may be identical with the statement of its nature; and these essential differentiations-of meanings of statements and of kinds of being-can, in turn, be made only by examination of the uses of words.
In general, things may be one in four different ways: in number, in species, in genus, or by analogy. A thing is one in number whose matter is one; things are one in species or form (Ebos) whose definition (Xo'yos) is one; things are one generically when they fall in the same category; and things are one analogically when they are related as a third thing is to a fourth. The latter forms of unity are always found when the former are, but the former are not always present in the latter: things that are one in number are all one in species, while not all things that are one in species are one in number; but things that are one in species are all one in genus, while things that are one in genus are not all one in species but are all one by analogy; and things that are one by analogy are not all one in genus.43 Or, again, the senses in which a thing may be said to be "one") may be classified by consideration of indivisibility of motion, on the one hand, and indivisibility of thought and formula, on the other. There are, once more, on this basis of classification, four senses in which a thing may be one: (1) the naturally continuous, and in this sense those things have more unity and are prior, whose movement is more indivisible and simpler; (2) the whole, and in this sense a thing is one because its movement is one and indivisible in place and time; (3) what is one in number, and in this sense the individual is indivisible; and (4) what is one in form or species, and in this sense the universal is indivisible in comprehension and knowledge.44 A thing may be the "same" if it is one in number, that is, in matter; or if it is one in both number and formula, that is, in matter and in form; or if the formula of its primary essence is one. 45 A thing is shown to be one in number when a variety of forms of appellation are substituted one for another in application to it. Those appellations may have an essential or an accidental relation to one another in the thing. An individual thing or a thing which is one in number is signified most strictly when the two words have the same definition, as "clothes" and "garment" may be applied to the same thing; or when a word and one of its definitions is used, as "animal that walks on two feet" is 43 Metaph. v. 6. 1016b3l-101793. 44 Ibid. x 1.. 105215-bl. 451 Ibid. 3. 1054-32-b3. the same as "man." But a property may be used in the same fashion, as when "what can acquire knowledge" is called the same as "man"; and even an accident will serve to identify an individual, as when "the man who is sitting," or "who is musical," is called the same as "Socrates."46 A distinction must be made, therefore, between "signifying one thing," as is done when the words applied to a single thing have the same meaning, and "signifying with respect to one thing," as is done when words like "white," "musical," and "Socrates" are used to signify the same person. Consequently, even when terms designate the same object, the connection between the terms must be investigated; and if a point has been proved about "clothes," the identity of "clothes" and "garment" must be demonstrated before the conclusion can be applied to "garment."47 Indeed, one of the errors of philosophers like Heraclitus and Lycophron consisted in supposing that all things are one in the same sense as "clothes" and "garment," that is, in the sense of possessing a single definition. 48 Individual things or things one in number are never predicable of a subject, although some varieties of individual things may be present in a subject.49 Terms which signify individuals, therefore, serve primarily as subjects of propositions; and the problem of scientific demonstration may be said to consist in relating such terms to predicates whose relation to them as subjects is established by inference from essential definitions and necessary premises. The problem must be viewed both in terms of the statement possible of an existent individual and in terms of the existence signified by a uni- The limitations set in discourse are, at the one extreme, individuals, to which discourse may be applied as subjects, and, at the other extreme, principles, which state the reasons for affirming predicates of subjects in the flow of discourse. There can be neither definition nor demonstration of sensible individual substances, because they have matter whose nature makes them capable of being or of not being. The individual is neither matter nor formula alone, but matter and formula; and science therefore treats both of existing things in their universal aspects and of universal laws of being and process in their existential applications by treating the formula in its generality. The formula, however, may include matter, not the individual matter of the concrete thing but the matter which is the potentiality of the processes proper to the thing, as the definition of "snub," as distinguished from "concave," includes "nose" without being dependent on reference to individual noses. The definitions of the physical sciences are of this sort. Or the formula may be independent of the matter in which the form must exist, as "concave" may be defined without reference to what is concave. The definitions of the mathematical sciences are of this sort.64 The causes and principles of the different things studied in the different sciences are different. Even those principles which the sciences share are the "same" only universally and analogically, not literally; and therefore it is only analogically that there are three elements and four causes and principles of all things.65 Yet for that very reason it is important that there is but one heaven, since 63 Ibid. 1OO7a21-bl7. 64 As substance in the sense of the concrete individual is distinct from substance in the sense of the universal definition, so, too, the rational process by which universals are known is distinct from the sensitive processes by which particulars are experienced; and the same word, X6yos, is used to signify "definition" as contrasted to concrete thing and "reason" as contrasted to sense. The universals of science are differentiated from the particulars of sense as that which is better known in nature in contrast to that which is better known to us; and the effort of science is therefore to bring the evidence of sense and the evidence of argument or reason into conformity and agreement. Aristotle's scientific works are dotted with passages in which he tries to supplement 72 Ibid. iv. 11. 219b19-33. 78 Ibid. iv. 3. 222a33-b5. 74 The organization of propositions and the processes of reasoning cannot be made to duplicate in all details the structure of things and the phenomena of becoming, and it is easily possible to reason erroneously even from sound principles and to misinterpret accurate observations. Reasoning rests on statements, mental or verbal, and consists in following through to other assertions from what has been stated; refutation is reasoning which leads to the contradiction of a given proposition. There is no simple means of avoiding the danger in both reasoning and refutation that the principle may seem to be true and the inference may seem to follow in the words or even in the interpretation of the words, and yet principle and conclusion may reflect nothing in fact. We cannot exhibit the things themselves in argument or avoid recourse to symbolic devices, and undue skepticism concerning the discrepancies between the changing 90 Phys. iii. 7. 207a33-bl;
On the Heavens iii. 8. it is also, in another sense, not only distinct from thought but even contrary to it. The same method of discussion, consequently, is not suited to all opponents, for some stand in need of persuasion and others of compulsion. In the one case, the thought rather than the expressed argument must be met, and the thought is often based on difficulties derived from observation of the sensible world: refutation in such discussions should be directed to removing the source of error or ignorance. In the other case, those who argue for the sake of argument (Xob-os) can be convinced only by emending the argument as expressed in words ;110 for it is possible to speak rightly in a sense and still think wrongly or be ignorant in another sense, since one's words may have a defensible meaning if properly qualified."' Sometimes similar arguments are advanced by those who hold a conviction and those who merely assert the position without conviction;1"2 sometimes it is utterly impossible to believe what is asserted, as, for example, in the case of the assertion that the same thing is and is not, which some people think Heraclitus made; and, in general, a man does not necessarily believe what he says."3 Aristotle finds many instances in the doctrines of earlier philosophersll4 in which a position is held, not because it resolves a difficulty, but merely for the sake of argument;1"5 and, conversely, one of the signs which he adduces to show that scientific demonstration must proceed from necessary premises is the objection which we raise against any professed demand by the particular which participated in it was used univocally and not equivocally (cf. Meta ph. i. 6. onstration, that its major premist is not a necessary truth, either because we think it impossible absolutely or at least for the sake of argument. "6 When a point is a matter of indifference to the inquiry in hand, it may be assumed for the sake of argument;"17 but some limitation must be put on such modes of argument because of their effect, not on the argument, but on the hearer. It is dangerous, thus, to maintain some positions-such as that pleasure is the good and that to do injustice is better than to suffer it-because resentment is inspired if one is thought to maintain them, not for the sake of argument, but because one really thinks them to be true."8 Even the use of language that flows from knowledge is no guaranty of its meaning, for scientific proofs and the verses of Empedocles can be uttered by men under the influence of the passions, and those who have just begun to learn a science can string together scientific phrases without knowing the science."9 Indeed, one usually has recourse to a long story (Xoyos), like those which slaves tell, when one has nothing sound to say.'20 The rule in interpretation, conversely, is to seek meanings in content or intention rather than in the accidents of words; and, even in the case of law, the rule of equity bids us be merciful to the weaknesses of human nature, to think less about the laws than about the man who framed them, and less about what he said (X6-yos) than about what he meant (A6yvota).12' It is useful, tor dialectical purposes, to have examined the number of meanings of a term both for the sake of clarity and to insure that our reasonings be in accordance with the actual facts and not ad- 
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dressed to the terms alone. Such examination helps one also both to avoid being misled and to mislead by false reasoning. The latter manner of verbal discussion, however, is not proper even to dialectic, and dialecticians should resort to it only when the subject of discussion cannot be treated in any other way;"22 and it is justified then, under the rule that against an objector who sticks at nothing the defense should stick at nothing.123 The demonstration of the ambiguity of their terms is not an effective device against people who argue eristically, and they must be treated, not as refuting but as merely appearing to refute, for arguments are solved in such discussions by appeal to general estimation rather than to truth; but ambiguities should be removed from definitions in most discussions, and even against Platonists the demonstration that some of Plato's definitions do not apply to the Ideas is a useful argument.'24 Nonetheless, even in the treatment of fallacies and sophistical refutations, where the argument which turns on words alone is the commonest and most usual source of fallacies,125 the distinction between arguments directed against the expression and arguments directed against the thought is absurd, for any pertinent treatment of the expression, even when the words are used ambiguously, is directed against the thought ;126 and, conversely, in the fallacy of many questions, when several problems are made into one, the refutation is purely verbal and therefore no refutation.127
In scientific discourse the formula is considered in relation to its subject matter, and the adequacy or truth of state- Xb'yos) implies instruction, and there are audiences who are unaffected by scientific reasons as there are people whom one cannot instruct.129 If discourse is used for the purposes of science and for the attainment of truth, the proposition is constructed to express a reason or an argument adequate to the form of the thing, and all three-statement, reason, and form-may be signified by the same word, X&yoS. If discourse is used for the purposes of communication and for the inducement of conviction, the effectiveness of reasons and the conception of subject matter are both determined by the constitution and predisposition of the audience. Three kinds of persuasion are furnished by speech (X6'yos): the first depends on the character of the speaker, the second on putting the hearer into a certain state of mind, and the third on the speech (X6yos) itself in so far as it proves or seems to prove.'30
What is true and what is just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites and to be more persuasive; but, whereas the end of inquiry and proof is to bring formula, knowledge, and thing into coincidence, persuasion is produced if the speech is delivered in a manner which arouses confidence in the speaker or if the passions of the hearers are aroused by the speech or if a truth or apparent truth is established in the speech by means of ar-guments apparently suited to the subject matter. To employ these means of persuasion the speaker must be capable (1) of syllogizing or reasoning, (2) of understanding characters and virtues, and (3) of understanding the passions and how they are aroused. The art of rhetoric, which is the study of means of persuasion, is therefore closely related to ethics and politics; and the manner of their relation may be seen, as was true also of the relation of logic to the theoretic sciences, by the derivative meanings attached to the word X6o-os by the extension of "discourse" to the rational processes pertinent to the functions of speech. In scientific discourse the effort is to discover a formula or reason or form; X6-yos is contrasted as reason, in this enterprise, to both sensation and the concrete thing, in spite of the fact that verbal discourse may be in contradiction with reason. In practical discourse the effort is not to know virtue but to make men virtuous, and virtue is determined by the rule of right reason; Xo6yos is contrasted as reason, in this enterprise, to character and passion, in spite of the fact that words may be determined by passion and action may be determined by words or passions rather than by reason. Rhetoric is therefore not an instrument of ethics and politics, although it is useful; and its scope, like that of dialectic, which likewise derives its principles from opinions and common-places, is not limited to any one subject matter but is universal. The criterion for rhetorical performance is not found in right reason, which determines the virtues of men and their relations under law, but in the common-places by which arguments are selected appropriate to speaker, occasion, and audience. Logic is an instrument of the sciences, since it treats of the construction and demonstration of formulae which express the nature and processes of things. Rhetoric, as a faculty of per- Eth. x. 9. 1179b2-31. Discourse may be considered, finally, not only in relation to its subject matter or to men but in relation to the structure and unity which a work of literature possesses when viewed as a concrete whole (aw'oXov) composed of form and matter. Poetry is an imitation of things as they are or ought to be, and each kind of poetry produces its proper pleasure; but it is also a whole, complete in itself, with a beginning, middle, and end and with all the organic unity of a living creature.140 Aristotle therefore analyzes tragedy-and, by 137 implication, the other forms of poetry and the fine arts in general would submit to similar analyses-in terms of a whole consisting of six parts: plot, character, diction, thought, spectacle, and melody, of which two are derived from the means, one from the manner, and three from the object of imitation. Discourse not only supplies the matter from which the tragedy is constructed, since it is expressed in language (Xo6yos) with pleasurable accessories, but also the form, since the argument or plot ( In thought are included whatever effects are to be produced by language. Some of these effects are proof and refutation, the arousing of emotions (such as pity, fear, anger, and the like), and again amplification and diminution. But it is clear that in the incidents also, when effects of pity or terror or amplification or probability are to be produced, the same rules must 37 be used. The only difference is that the effects in action must be apparent without explanation, whereas the effects in language are produced by the speaker and arise from his lan- The differentiation of the scientific, practical, and artistic uses of language serves to isolate the criteria that are relevant to the consideration of statements as argument and proof, as incitation to action or influence to good, and as artistic form and aesthetic object. Such distinctions do not depend, however, on classifying statements in fixed genera, as if they had natural forms, definitions, and species. A work which is essentially poetic may be practical in its effects on the characters of men and scientific in its statement of incidental arguments; and it may therefore be considered, so long as attention is directed either to practical consequences or to theoretic precision, in terms of other criteria than those of poetry. Poetry is treated as such in the Poetics; its educa- A poem, thus, may be considered in terms of its own unity, its effect on audiences, or its imitation of actual things. To consider a poem in itself, however, is to consider what Aristotle calls its "proper pleasure," that is, its effect on an audience so constituted and informed that its reactions may be traced to causes proper to the work of art, but not necessarily on an audience taken at random, which might react to qualities accidental to a poem or its circumstances. The examination of such reactions without some control to relate the reactions of the audience to qualities in the poem would furnish information concerning audiences rather than insight into the work of art. To consider a poem in itself is likewise to consider it as an organization of incidents, a development of characters, and an expression of thoughts, and all of these are effective as imitations of nature and of life; but they are effective not as a literal report of what actually occurs but as an artistic representation which has a life of its own and a probability which does not depend on historical accuracy.
A scientific argument, similarly, may be considered in terms of its adequacy to the facts, its effect on those who examine it, and its own structure of development. To consider a demonstrative argument in terms of its adequacy to the facts, however, is to trace it to first principles, which are indemonstrable. Principles which are believed by all men or by a consensus of scientists competent in the field are taken as true; yet the arguments to justify the acceptance of the principle scientifically are derived from the nature of things rather than from the authority of scientists, although that may be sufficient grounds for the belief of laymen. To consider a demonstrative argument in terms of its adequacy to the facts is likewise to trace the steps of its proof and the meanings of its terms; but the structure of symbolic organization and the assumed definitions are determined neither by the nature of the symbols themselves nor by arbitrary conventions and modes of operation but by the structure of things examined in the inquiries of the sciences.
A rhetorical argument, finally, may be examined in terms of its probable effects on an audience, its adequacy to its subject matter, or its formal structure. To consider a rhetorical speech in terms of persuasion, however, is also to examine the subject matter treated, not as it is according to the conclusions of the most competent experts and scientists, but as it may be presented most effectively to a given kind of audience. To consider a rhetorical speech in terms of persuasion is likewise to consider its organization and structure, not as a work of art or as a demonstration of science, but in terms of the appropriateness of the style and arrangement to the audience and circumstances of the speech.
The various uses to which language is put are thus subject to three arts of language-logic, rhetoric, and poetic-in which different purposes and different criteria select different aspects of language to constitute different wholes from different parts. Poetry may be distinguished from prose, and the prose of rhetorical metaphor may be distinguished from the prose of literal logical proposition, by characteristics that can be found in the least parts of which statements are composed, as well as in the causes of unity which bind parts into organized wholes. Those characteristics of treatise, speech, and poem; of syllogism, enthymeme, and plot; of interpretation, communication, and style; and of proposition, sentence, and verse reflect in the qualities and structure of language the uses to which language is put and the relation of language to the thought expressed and to the subject matter treated.
In the sciences the concern is with statements literally true of some subj ect matter, and the least part of the discourse with which the logician is concerned is therefore a "term" or a word with a definition. Words which are used univocally, that is, when both the word and the definition answering to the word are the same, are carefully differentiated from words which are used equivocally, that is, when a common name has different definitions, and from words which are related derivatively, that is, when words have different terminations but one is derived from the other. On the basis of those distinctions it is possible to enumerate ultimate categories of terms by considering their manner of definition, predication, derivation, contrariety, or variation in degree. Once nouns have been differentiated from verbs by considerations of predication and time, a sentence may be defined as a significant portion of speech, some parts of which have an independent meaning as an utterance, though not as the expression of a judgment. The concern of logic is limited to propositions, that is, sentences which are true or false; and all other sentences, such as prayers, commands, threats, or all statements considered in any function other than their expression of truth or falsity, are relegated to the study of rhetoric or poetic.'51 A premise is a sentence affirming or denying one thing of another, and a syllogism or an argument is constructed by so relating two premises that one term may be affirmed or denied of all or of some of another term because of the relations of those two terms to a third term. Moreover, the affirmation or denial in the premises and the conclusion may be merely stated or may be stated to be necessary or probable. A science, viewed in terms of the data of experience and the processes of inquiry, may be treated as a collection of terms and the interrelations among them: subjects of which attributes happen to be asserted, consequents which follow from their assertion, and attributes inconsistent with them. The principles of the science will be found in that collection of terms, but as argument and proof the science is dependent on the pre-existent knowledge from which the conclusion follows in teaching or demonstration. Since scientific knowledge cannot be other than it is, the truth obtained by demonstration will be necessary; and scientific demonstration must be an inference from necessary premises, that is, from premises in which the attribute is true in every instance of its subject, essential and not accidental to its subject, and universal. We may, to be sure, fall into error in supposing our conclusion to be primary and universal, but the search for scientific principles is an in-'15 Interpret. 4. 17&1-7; ef. Poet. 19. 1456b8-13. quiry into essential definitions of the various genera of things and into the causes of inherence of attributes in the subjects in which they are found.
The logician is concerned with the examination of the conditions of proof and definition, for, although demonstration and scientific knowledge treat of necessary laws and invariable connections in things, it is possible to state the origins from which principles are derived and the grounds on which they are tested as well as the ways in which conclusions are derived validly from them in any science; and, although the sciences are distinguished from each other by their subject matters, principles, and methods and although demonstration cannot move from one genus of things to another, the logic of propositions and proof is common to the sciences. The entire analysis, not only of premises and demonstrative syllogisms but also of terms, depends on the assumption of a difference between essential and accidental predication based on a difference between substance and accident in existence. The demonstration of the existence of substance is the task of the metaphysician, and the subject of his inquiry includes the relation of statement to things, not, however, as the logician considers that relation but as an inquiry into their relative status as two instances of existence and into the implications derived from the nature of statements which are valid for the conditions of being. Examination of the principles of the sciences, which are proper in each case to the genus of things studied in each science, leads the metaphysician to the examination of the most certain principles of all things, which are both best known and nonhypothetical -the principle of contradiction and the principle of excluded middle. These principles are strictly indemonstrable, but they are subject to negative demonstration by reductio ad absurdum, since any statement whatsoever, including statements about substance and accident, can be shown to depend on assuming them. The basic truths which are common to several sciences are one, not literally but by analogy, since they are used differently in application to the particular genera of the different sciences. A principle of limitation may therefore be applied in the mathematical and physical sciences, since it is not the function of a scientist to demonstrate the existence of his subject matter or to solve difficulties that do not arise, truly or falsely, from the principles of his science. The differentiation of the theoretic sciences, which have as their end simply to know, depends on differences found in the things which constitute their subject matter, but it can be stated in terms of differences in their principles and in the necessity of their conclusions.
One large class of things exists "by nature," and such natural or physical things are distinguished from the products of art by the possession of an internal principle of motion and rest. They move and remain stationary in place according to fixed principles; some of them increase or decrease in size as a result of biological processes; some change in the qualities they possess and are generated and pass away. These natural things include compound inorganic bodies and their constitutive elements, plants and their parts, animals and their parts; all such objects are studied in the sciences of physics, which are, in turn, differentiated into the various subdivisions of physical, biological, and psychological inquiry, according to kinds of natures and motions. In general, the concern of physics with "natures" is reflected in its definitions and principles, for they are never purely formal but always include consideration of matter and motion, and they are arrived at by induction from the changing things of experience. The surfaces and volumes, lines, points, and numbers, which are the subject matter of mathematics, are contained, like the properties studied by the physicist, in physical bodies; and, indeed, they are also treated as physical properties rather than as mathematical entities in the various branches of physics. The mathematician, however, treats them differently from the physicist, for, although they cannot exist apart from matter and motion in fact, they can be abstracted in thought and treated separately in science. The definitions of mathematics therefore involve no reference to matter but are related to physical definitions as "curved" is to "snub"; and the principles of mathematics depend on this peculiarity of quantity which makes it alone among the properties of things susceptible of abstract scientific development. Quantities, so understood, include not only numbers, points, lines, surfaces, and solids but speech, time, and space, and the mathematical proposition takes its most characteristic form as a formula which states a proportion or an equality. Things and their qualities may be arranged in serial order or in proportions; and, in addition to the inferential consequences which follow concerning quantities in mathematics, proportions may be found in the consideration of motions, the genera of animals, the nature of justice in the physical and practical sciences, in analogies which yield insight into the likenesses of things in metaphysics, and in metaphors which have both rhetorical and poetic uses. Finally, those forms which not only can be known but also can exist apart from matter and motion are studied in First Philosophy or metaphysics. The concern of metaphysics with being as such, therefore, involves inquiry not only into the ultimate principles of knowledge and the ultimate causes of existence and change but also into the principles of order, the unmoved movers, which, themselves exempt from the muta-bility of which they are the source and formulation, determine the interrelations of the universe, and among which God is supreme. The general differentiation of forms according to their existence and intelligibility in matter and apart from matter determines the differences among the definitions and principles, and therefore among the methods of inquiry and proof, in the three theoretic sciences-physics, mathematics, and metaphysics.
All three of the theoretic sciences, despite differences in their subject matter and, consequently, in their principles, treat of that which cannot be other than it is-that is, with the necessary rather than the contingent. Scientific propositions must be necessary, not merely probable; but necessity may be either "simple" or "hypothetical." Simple or absolute necessity is found in the relation of properties and definitions or essences, which imply each other and which are never found separate one from the other. Both the processes of physics and the inferences of mathematics require departure from this simple necessity to two varieties of hypothetical necessity. Both involve assumptions, which, if granted or satisfied, yield necessary conclusions; but the direction of the hypothetical reasoning is precisely opposite in the two sciences: in mathematics from antecedents to consequents, in physics from consequents to antecedents.'52 In mathematics if the premises are granted or are established, the argument can be shown to follow necessarily, but the premises are not necessarily true if the conclusion which is shown to follow from them is known to be true. In physics, if a process or motion has been completed, the antecedent steps can be shown to have occurred necessarily, but it does not follow from the existence of the antecedent stages that the effect must necessarily follow. The conclusions of mathematics are 44 RICHARD MCKEON Finally, and for much the same reason, the style and the arrangement of a rhetorical speech form a separate consideration in rhetoric, for, when language may be metaphorical as well as literal, words are an additional means of persuasion and their effective use depends on additional criteria found in the correctness, impressiveness, appropriateness, and rhythm of language. Scientific demonstration must be expressed in univocal terms and literal statement, and the criteria of expression, like those of thought, are determined by considerations of adequacy to the subject matter of the demonstration. Dialectical proof and refutation are directed to removing ambiguity, and the virtues of language are determined by the intellectual processes by which properties and definitions are separated from accidents. Rhetoric, however, has three separate problems in the use of language for persuasion, for the effects of argument depend not only on the plausibility derived from (1) adapting the argument to the issue and (2) making it acceptable to the audience but also on (3) the style in which the argument is set forth and the arrangement of the statement and proof.
The language of poetry is distinct from that of prose;158 and, although oratorical prose at first took on a poetical color in writers like Gorgias, poetic may be distinguished from rhetoric by differences in the uses of the common resources of language and metaphor which distinguish poetic and rhetorical styles, in turn, from the literal predications and proofs of logic. The poetic use of language is not defined, however, by the use of verse and poetic rhythms but depends on the nature of poetry. A medical or physical theory does not become poetry by being stated in verse, but the nature of poetry is to be found in imitation,159 while science con- 158 Ibid. W1. 1. 1404al9-38. 159 Poet. 1. 1447bl6-21. sists in demonstration from necessary and primary principles. Nor is the distinetion between history and poetry in the fact that one is written in prose and the other in verse; for history is not made poetry by being turned into verse, but history describes the thing that has been, while poetry describes the possible, and the statements of history are therefore singulars, while those of poetry are of the nature of universals.'60
The possibility of science depends on argument which flows from definitions or formulae of what is essential in the nature of things; the possibility of poetry depends on a plot or argument which imitates what is possible of occurrence. Since questions of existence in general involve questions of unity and since to be is to be one, the differences in the constitution and existence of sciences and poems may be seen in the differences in the conditions of their being one. A single science deals with one genus of things,'6' and a single poem represents one action.'62 In short, the unity of a science is based on the nature of a kind of thing, while the unity of a poem reflects the completion of a kind of happening. The differences between these two sources of unity may be seen by contrasting the marks of unity found in the proofs of science with those found in the plot of poetry and by comparing the sources of necessity and probability on which each is grounded.
The unity of demonstrative proof is additive, that is, it is found in the parts and in the combinations of parts into wholes, by the opposition of terms, prior and posterior, and the interposition of middle terms; and for this reason Aristotle is careful to state the conditions which mark the single term,163 the single proposition,164 the single syllogism,166 and the basic premises peculiar to each science.'66 Science depends on the discovery of middle terms to account for properties of things or connections among things. A science may therefore grow without endangering its unity, not by the interposition of fresh middle terms, since the true cause of the connection is sought, but, by the apposition of fresh extreme terms and, consequently, by the addition of new conclusions.167 There may, however, be more than one demonstration of one connection, but in each case the true cause of a connection is the proximate and not the universal cause. 168 The unity of a poem, on the other hand, is organic, that is, it depends on the completeness of the work as a whole possessed of a beginning, middle, and end. The other parts of the poem-characters, thought, diction, melody, and spectacle-depend on the primary part, plot, which is the life and soul of a tragedy; and the incidents which make up the single action of the plot are so related to the whole that the transposition or omission of one of them will disjoin and dislocate the whole.'69 The other parts of a tragedy may be arranged serially after plot, according to their effectiveness in achieving the end of the poem: second after plot come the characters, and, indeed, some suppose erroneously that the unity of a plot consists in having one man as its subject; third comes thought; fourth, diction; and, of the remaining two, melody is the greatest of the pleasurable acces- sories of tragedy, and spectacle, though an attraction, has the least to -do with the art of poetry. The unity sought in the practical sciences is achieved in the character of the individual man and the constitution of the state. Rhetoric has analogies to the methods of all sciences: theoretic, practical, and productive. It is similar to logic in that persuasion is effected by argument: the parts of a speech are the statement of the case and the proof, and these are comparable to the statement of a problem and the demonstration;"70 the relevant parts of speech in both rhetorical and logical argument are the noun and the verb; but the greater dependence of rhetoric on verbal connections gives the conjunction an importance for rhetoric which it does not have for logic ;171 and the unity is additive, in the sense that the speech has no natural definition or determination of unity, and the style of prose must be either free-running, in which the parts are united by nothing except the connecting words, or periodic, in which the speech is composed of periods, complete in themselves, and the periods may, in turn, be further divisible into members.'72 The criterion for determining the unity of the period is not derived, as the criterion for the unity of a proposition is, from consideration of its subject matter but rather resembles the marks of the unity of a poem; for a period is a portion of speech that has in itself a beginning and an end, being at the same time not too big to be taken in at a glance. But rhetoric differs from both logic and poetic in that a speech has no least parts comparable to the univocal terms of scientific demonstrations and no organic whole comparable to the plots of dramas; for the 170 Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Quintilian are authorities for the later tradition, built on these passages, that Aristotle enumerated three parts of speech: the noun, the verb, and the conjunction.
